Iran has restored operational access to 30 of its 33 Hormuz missile sites and retains 70% of its prewar missile stockpile, posing a continued threat to warships and oil tankers, US assessments show.

Summary:

• US assessments reviewed by people with knowledge of the findings show Iran has restored operational access to 30 of the 33 missile sites it maintains along the Strait of Hormuz, according to the New York Times
• The restored sites give Iran the ability to deploy mobile launchers to alternative locations and, in some cases, to launch missiles directly from fixed launchpads within the facilities
• Only three of the 33 missile sites along the strait remain completely inaccessible, according to the assessments
• Iran has retained approximately 70% of its mobile missile launchers and roughly 70% of its prewar missile stockpile, encompassing both ballistic missiles capable of targeting regional nations and shorter-range cruise missiles for use against land or sea targets,
• The findings are described as particularly alarming to senior US officials given the threat the restored sites pose to American warships and commercial oil tankers transiting the narrow waterway,

Iran has restored operational access to 30 of the 33 missile sites it maintains along the Strait of Hormuz, according to US assessments that senior officials have described as deeply alarming, raising the prospect that Tehran’s ability to threaten commercial shipping and American naval vessels in the waterway is far greater than previously understood.

The assessments, the details of which were reported by the New York Times, indicate that damage inflicted on the sites during the conflict has been repaired or worked around to varying degrees depending on the individual facility. In most cases, Iran retains the ability to move mobile launchers housed within the sites to alternative locations, providing flexibility that makes the threat harder to neutralise through targeted strikes. In a number of instances, Iran can launch missiles directly from fixed launchpads that remain intact within the facilities themselves. Only three of the 33 sites are considered entirely inaccessible at this stage.

Beyond the missile sites, the assessments point to the broader resilience of Iran’s military capability. Tehran still fields approximately 70% of its mobile launchers across the country and has held on to roughly 70% of its prewar missile stockpile. That inventory spans two distinct categories of weapon: ballistic missiles with the range to reach other nations across the region, and a supply of cruise missiles designed for shorter-range engagements against targets on land or at sea. Together, they represent a substantial and operationally ready arsenal that has survived the conflict in materially better shape than may have been assumed.

The findings carry direct and significant implications for energy markets. The Strait of Hormuz remains the transit point for a substantial share of the world’s crude oil and liquefied natural gas exports, and the credible presence of Iranian missile capability along its shores reinforces the case for a prolonged disruption to normal shipping patterns. Iran has already demonstrated a willingness to use control of the strait as a geopolitical instrument, shifting from an initial posture of attempting to block traffic entirely to one of selectively granting transit access on its own terms.

For any diplomatic effort to restore normal tanker movements through the waterway, the status of Iran’s missile infrastructure will need to be a central rather than peripheral consideration. Assessments showing that 30 of 33 sites remain at least partially operational suggest the military leverage underpinning Tehran’s negotiating position is considerably stronger than the damage inflicted during the conflict might have implied.